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WE COULD PASS A LAW... WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN
IF CONTINGENT LEGAL FEES WERE BANNED
Samuel R. Gross*
I. BACKGROUND
This is an exercise in fantasy. My task is to imagine what would
happen if we simply abolished the institution of the contingent fee by
statute. I cannot justify that task on grounds of urgency. Contingent
fees are not about to be abolished, and they probably.are not going to
be seriously restricted. My hope is that the exercise will be amusing in
itself, and that in the process we might learn something about contin-
gent fees as we now use them.
I need to define my terms. The archetypal American contingent
legal fee is a thirty-three percent commission that a plaintiffs' lawyer
collects from the proceeds of the claims she handles.' Sometimes the
percentage is higher or lower; often it varies depending on the stage at
which recovery is obtained (e.g., thirty-three percent of a settlement
before the pre-trial conference, forty percent of a judgment or a set-
tlement after the pre-trial conference). Whatever the precise terms,
this is almost the exclusive form of compensation for plaintiffs' law-
yers in personal injury cases and the common form of compensation
for lawyers for individual or small-business plaintiffs in other types of
cases.2 This fee structure has two major consequences, both of which
are regularly described by plaintiffs' attorneys as major advantages to
their clients: No win, No pay ("If I don't win, you don't owe me any-
thing"), and the lawyer's fee is proportional to the client's recovery
("We're partners"). The out-of-pocket expenses of litigation-for in-
vestigation, depositions, expert witness fees, travel, exhibits, etc.-are
handled somewhat differently. Under the usual contingent fee con-
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. I would like to thank Kent Syverud, Karen Ni-
cole Stitt, Brian Donadio and the participants at the Third Annual Clifford Seminar on Tort Law
and Social Policy, addressing Contingency Fee Financing of Litigation in America, Chicago, Illi-
nois, April 4-5, 1997, for help and suggestions at various stages in the preparation of this Article.
1. Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice, 47
DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 285-90 (1998).
2. HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER: LAWYERS AND ORDINARY LITIGATION 58-
59 (1990); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared
to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 15-18 (1996).
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tract, the client is responsible for these costs but the lawyer advances
them.3 In practice, out-of-pocket costs are paid from the recovery or
not at all; most lawyers do not attempt to collect them if they lose.4
This treatment of costs reduces the client's net recovery if there is a
recovery, but leaves No Win, No Pay intact. Since American jurisdic-
tions rarely require the loser to pay the winner's attorney's fees, this
means that, as a practical matter, an American plaintiff can pursue a
claim without risking any positive financial liability.
The central tenet of the American contingent fee is No Win, No
Pay. If the idea is to end contingent fees as we know them, that fea-
ture would have to be prohibited. Liability for legal fees could not
depend entirely on a favorable result; at least some portion of the fee
would be owed regardless of the outcome of the case. Within that
restriction, the rule could permit bonuses for favorable outcomes
(partial contingencies), or prohibit bonuses and require fees to be set
entirely by the hour, or by the nature of the claim, with no variation
that depends on the result. If the new rule allowed sufficiently high
bonuses, coupled with sufficiently low fixed or hourly fees, it would, of
course, permit a fee structure that is not very different from the con-
tingent fees we now use. For the moment, I will leave open the issue
of performance bonuses, but assume that our hypothetical anti-contin-
gent fee statute, whatever else it does, requires that the bulk of a law-
yer's compensation be fixed without regard to the outcome of the case
for which the lawyer is hired.
Contingent fees are popular among plaintiffs for two primary rea-
sons: they provide financing to advance the costs of pursuing a claim;
and they shift the risk of not recovering those costs, and of not ob-
taining a recovery that will pay the lawyer's fees, from the client to the
lawyer. Some plaintiffs may also be motivated by the apparent con-
vergence of the lawyers' interests and their own under a contingent
fee arrangement, but I suspect that is a secondary consideration. Tak-
ing these as the main motivations for our use of contingent fees, I
expect that the responses to the abolition of this arrangement would
fall into three categories:
3. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(e) (1996): "A lawyer shall not
provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation,
except that: (1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of
which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter ..... Id.
There is a limited exception to this rule: "(2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay
court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client." Id.
4. Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations,
and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 349 n.71 (1991); Kritzer, supra note 1,
at 270.
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1. Finding other ways to shift the risks and costs of litigation away
from individual plaintiffs.
2. Devising methods to reduce the overall costs and risks of ob-
taining compensation for injuries or losses.
3. Reducing the number of claims pursued by plaintiffs.
I will talk about these three categories of possible effects in turn, with-
out systematically considering the relationships between them. In re-
ality, if we ever got to that point, one response to the abolition of
contingent fees might trump several others, or otherwise affect them
in unpredictable ways.
II. WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN
A. Financing and Risk Spreading
1. Cheating
The single most likely response to a legislative attempt to abolish
contingent fees would be resistance. The simplest form is outright law
breaking: plaintiffs and lawyers could continue to enter into illegal
contingent fee contracts on about the same terms as those now used.
Perhaps there would be a cover contract for an hourly fee, but at the
end of the day everybody would settle for a fee that equals one-third
of the recovery-with costs paid from the recovery, if there is one, or
by the lawyer, if there is not. If both parties were happy with the
arrangement, the violation, like most victimless violations, would be
hard to detect and harder to prevent. This would no doubt happen,
just as lawyers now sometimes violate the rules in related ways that
are equally unstoppable-for example, by lending money to tort
plaintiffs to tide them over. The question is, how often would it
happen?
The American legal system is capable of substantial hypocrisy. For
decades judges said that plea bargaining was improper and illegal, and
insisted that criminal defendants deny on the record that their guilty
pleas were in fact the products of bargaining, while simultaneously
they not only condoned plea bargaining but relied on it to run their
courts.5 Perhaps the same could happen here-perhaps contingent
fees could become illegal in theory but remain the rule in practice-
but I do not think so, at least not in this simple direct form. Judges
and prosecutors had direct incentives to collaborate with defense at-
torneys in protecting plea bargaining, and the only other participants
5. Jay Wishingrad, Comment, The Plea Bargain in Historical Perspective, 23 BuFF. L. REV.
499, 512-20 (1974) (discussing the history of hypocrisy in American plea bargaining, including
the court's past habit of attacking plea bargaining in theory and permitting it in practice).
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in the process were criminal defendants, an uncommonly powerless
and vulnerable group. Complaints by disgruntled criminal defendants
could be effectively disabled by requiring the defendants to deny in
open court that any plea bargaining ever took place. But neither civil
defense attorneys nor judges have a direct interest in civil plaintiffs'
fee arrangements, and there is no comparable mechanism to insulate
the plaintiffs' lawyers from complaints by unhappy clients with whom
they contracted for illegal contingent fees. Given the risk that dissat-
isfied contingent fee plaintiffs would complain to courts, bar authori-
ties, or public prosecutors, or that they would simply refuse to pay, I
expect that outright law breaking would be relatively uncommon. At
a minimum, any prohibition on contingent fees would stop most law-
yers from openly advertising them.
Lawyers would find it easier to engage in a less overt form of cheat-
ing. They could retain the No Win, No Pay aspect of contingent fees
by setting hourly or fixed fees, but refrain from collecting them if no
recovery is obtained-as lawyers have long done in other countries
that already prohibit contingent fees6 and as lawyers in this country
have long done for out-of-pocket expenses.7 I doubt if much could be
done to stop this practice, since it would only come into play in situa-
tions in which the client is not likely to complain. The risk of not
collecting the fee is a constant in the practice of law; tort lawyers
could hardly be condemned for simply failing to collect. But the eva-
sion would be spotted, and could be stopped, if it became flagrant.
Also, without the commission structure, No Pay, No Win is not neces-
sarily an attractive fee arrangement for the lawyer, since it includes no
premium to cover the risk of non-payment. That limitation would
push lawyers in two directions. On the one hand, they would be more
prone to turn away any case that is not a sure thing in order to mini-
mize their risk. On the other hand, they would try to build a risk
premium back into the fee, either explicitly through a performance
bonus' (if that is permitted) or, covertly, by setting fees high and then
only collecting a fraction of those fees, the amount of which depends
in part on the amount of the recovery. Needless to say, with a suffi-
ciently high performance bonus and an accepted practice of not col-
lecting the fee when there is no recovery, "non-contingent" fees would
become functionally indistinguishable from contingent fees. I am go-
6. HERBERT M. KRITZER, RHETORIC AND REALITY . .. USES AND ABUSES .. . CONTINGEN-
CIES AND CERTAINTIES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE AMERICAN CONTINGENT FEE 3-4
(University of Wis. Inst. for Legal Studies, Dispute Processing Research Program Working Paper
No. 11-8, 1995) (on file with the DePaul Law Review).
7. See supra note 4.
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ing to assume that would not happen. If we summoned up the polit-
ical will to outlaw contingent fees, I imagine we would police the
system carefully enough to prevent widespread and transparent eva-
sion, at least at first. Over time, if dissatisfaction grows, we might
slide back into hypocritical tolerance of open law breaking, as an ear-
lier generation did for prohibition.
2. Selling Claims
A contingent fee is, in effect, a contract by which a client sells a
fraction of her interest in a claim to a lawyer in return for legal serv-
ices in pursuing that claim. But why not sell it all? Why would an
injured accident victim not sell her entire claim, and in return receive
not merely legal services in obtaining damages, but a discounted pay-
ment of the damages themselves? For the accident victim, the advan-
tages of prompt and certain compensation are enormous; she would
no doubt pay quite a bit to get them if she were allowed to do so. But
she is not. The common rule in American jurisdictions is that claims
based on contractual rights or on interests in real property may be
sold or assigned to third parties, but personal injury claims may not.8
"Reasonable" contingent fees are permitted, as an exception to the
non-assignment rule, but lawyers may not do anything in return for
that assignment other than provide legal services and advance the
costs of litigation expenses. 9
Several scholars have argued that a market for tort claims would
provide major benefits to the plaintiffs. 10 Under the current system,
individual tort plaintiffs are at a severe disadvantage in negotiating
with insurance companies or large institutional defendants. They
8. For a clear and succinct summary of the law on this issue, see Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market
in Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 329, 330-34 (1987), see also 6 AM. JUR. 2D
Assignments §§ 27-30 (1963), Annotation, Assignability of Claim for Personal Injury or Death, 40
A.L.R.2d 500 (1955) [hereinafter Assignability of Claim]. There is one common quasi-exception
to this general rule: a cause of action against an insurer for breach of its duty to settle-which
may in part be characterized as a personal injury claim-is assignable. Kent D. Syverud, The
Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1120 (1990); Annotation, Assignability of Insured's Right to
Recover over Against Liability Insurer for Rejection of Settlement Offer, 12 A.L.R.3d 1158, 1161-
63 (1967 & Supp. 1996).
9. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Contingent fees are permitted as assignments of a
portion of the proceeds of a claim, rather than an assignment of the claim itself. CHARLES W.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 8.13, at 491 (1985); see generally F.B. MACKINNON, CON-
TINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 14-15 (1964) (discussing general acceptability of legal fees
contingent upon the outcome of litigation).
10. Robert Cooter & Stephen D. Sugarman, A Regulated Market in Unmatured Tort Claims:
Tort Reform by Contract, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW 174, 175 (Walter Olson ed.,
1988); Peter Charles Choharis, A Comprehensive Market Strategy for Tort Reform, 12 YALE J.
ON REG. 435, 443, 474-525 (1995); Shukaitis, supra note 8, at 335-41.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
often suffer greatly from delays in receiving compensation, and they
cannot afford the risk of fighting and obtaining no recovery at all. To
avoid the costs of delay and the risk of loss, they may accept settle-
ments that are considerably lower than the value of their claims. But
a well financed assignee could pay the plaintiff a fair market price for
the claim and then negotiate with the defendant (or its insurer) in its
own behalf, on equal terms. If the negotiations failed, the claims
buyer would hire an attorney and sue. To do so successfully, the
claims buyer would need the cooperation of the plaintiff, which could
be guaranteed by a contractual obligation to cooperate, enforced by a
payment schedule that specifies that a portion of the total payment
would not be made until the conclusion of the case. The net result
would be a transfer of power and money from defendants and their
insurers to plaintiffs and their assignees.
Claims buyers would have other advantages over most individual
tort plaintiffs. Economies of scale might permit them to obtain com-
pensation more efficiently than plaintiffs' lawyers. As a result, they
ought to be able to profitably handle smaller claims than contingent-
fee lawyers are willing to take. Claims buyers might also be able to
consolidate claims for particular types of accidents, or claims against
particular defendants or particular insurance companies, especially if a
secondary market in claims emerges. Consolidation could reduce the
transactions costs of tort claims enormously. For example, if Global
Claim Buyers has accumulated 2,000 tort claims for which Universal
Insurance is financially responsible, the two companies will never
have to bargain over each case separately. All they will need to do is
negotiate over damage schedules, cost estimates, and discounts for
factual uncertainty-and perhaps actually investigate a small sub-sam-
ple of cases to check on the reliability of the information the other
side provides. Ultimately, even the most unpredictable disputes can
be compromised when they are reduced to probabilistic estimates of
the likely outcome and combined with a large number of other cases.
And who would these claims buyers be? The obvious candidates
are those entities that provide services or compensation to accident
victims: health care providers, disability insurers, large employers and
labor unions. However, if such a market ever did develop, there
might be a push to keep some of these entities from entering the
claim-purchasing business. Consumers might argue, for example, that
permitting health care providers to buy tort claims would tempt them
to take advantage of vulnerable victims of crippling accidents, and
that it would give them financial incentives that would conflict with
their professional and ethical obligations to their patients.
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There may be serious drawbacks to a market in legal claims. Ab-
sent other changes in the system, more claims would probably be
brought, and the total compensation for injuries would probably be
higher than under the present system. Whether that is good or bad is
largely a matter of point of view. To the extent that these are merito-
rious claims which now receive insufficient compensation, or none at
all, this would be an improvement. But if this shift is seen as adding
new baseless claims, or additional compensation for claims that are
already overcompensated, then it would be bad. Either way, it would
create a new set of players in the litigation game, some of whom might
accumulate a great deal of economic power. That would produce a
variety of dangers. In the absence of sufficient competition for claims,
or for particular types of claims, claim buyers might rake in exorbitant
profits. Perhaps antitrust regulation could take care of that problem;
perhaps not. In addition, there is the danger of collusion between
mega plaintiffs and mega defendants. For example, secrecy agree-
ments might be possible on an unprecedented scale."l
Ultimately, if legal claims could be freely traded, our system for
handling third-party claims would evolve to take on many of the fea-
tures of first-party insurance. A typical accident victim would go to a
claim-buying outfit-most likely, one with which she has some preex-
isting connection-and agree on a schedule of compensation. The
claim buyer would gather information, bundle the case together with
dozens or hundreds or others, and sell them all back to the defendant
or its insurer. Litigation would continue to be an option in theory, but
would atrophy in practice.
However persuasive the arguments for a market in tort claims, they
have had no impact in practice. This is hardly surprising. While plain-
tiffs might well benefit from the change, plaintiffs' attorneys decidedly
would not; there would be much less tort litigation and most of that
would be handled by in-house counsel for large tort-claim purchasing
conglomerates. Civil defense attorneys, the other side of the litigation
11. Secrecy as a condition of settlement has received a great deal of attention in the past
decade, mostly in the context of medical malpractice and product liability litigations. Critics
claim that confidentiality agreements enable defendants to hide information about dangerous
products or negligent practices from their victims. See Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confi-
dentiality Controversy, 25 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 502-05 (1991); William Wagner, Secrecy Betrays
Justice, NAT'L L.J., July 24, 1989, at 17, 22; Elsa Walsh & Benjamin Weiser, Court Secrecy Masks
Safety Issues: Key GM Fuel Tank Memo Kept Hidden in Auto Crash Suits, WASH. POST, Oct. 23,
1988, at Al; Benjamin Weiser & Elsa Walsh, Drug Firm's Strategy: Avoid Trial, Ask Secrecy;
Records Reveal Story of Zomax Recall, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1988, at Al; Benjamin Weiser &
Elsa Walsh, Hundreds of Cases Shrouded in Secrecy: Area Suits Often Sealed with Few Queries,
WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1988, at Al; Benjamin Weiser & Elsa Walsh, Secret Filing, Settlement Hide
Surgeon's Record; Questions Raised over Patients' Deaths, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1988, at Al.
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coin, would suffer a comparable loss of business. And civil defendants
would also suffer because they would end up paying higher damages
and paying them in a higher proportion of cases. In other words, most
of the stable long-term players in the field would suffer by the creation
of a market for tort claims. 12 In order for the present system to func-
tion, of course, the needs of one-shot player plaintiffs must be taken
care of to the extent necessary to provide them with access to the
courts. Contingent fees do just that. Given the availability of contin-
gent fees, no serious movement to make tort claims marketable has
ever developed.
As usual, there are exceptions to the general rule that tort claims
may not be assigned. 13 A few states, conspicuously Texas, do permit
the assignment of personal injury claims, at least under some circum-
stances. 14 And yet, as far as I can tell, no practice of selling claims
outright has developed in those states. Why not? Part of the answer
is that even where assignment is not prohibited outright, state govern-
ments have taken steps to discourage it. In Texas, for example, the
anti-barratry statute, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting legal cli-
ents, was extended to non-lawyers in 1917 for the specific purpose of
closing down the business of one Frank McCloskey, a non-lawyer who
made a living by buying up personal injury claims. 15
12. I have not mentioned the effect of a market in tort claims on insurance companies because
the impact of that structure on their interests is unpredictable. To the extent that such a change
increases the total liability payments by tort defendants, it might increase the business and the
profits of the companies that insure against such liability. However, to the extent that it makes
damage payments more routine and predictable, it might lead to an increase in the proportion of
damages that are paid through self-insurance or other modes of financing that bypass the insur-
ance industry since liability insurance is marketed, in part, as a protection against uncertain and
unpredictable risks. See Kent D. Syverud, On the Demand for Liability Insurance, 72 TEx. L.
REv. 1629, 1633-34 (1994).
13. As noted earlier, a claim by an insured against an insurer for breach of duty to settle may
be assigned, even though it is in some respects, a tort claim. Syverud, supra note 8, at 1120. This
is one of those exceptions that proves the rule: this type of assignment is designed to facilitate the
existing system of representation in tort litigation. In the usual case, a defendant who was on the
wrong end of a massive civil liability judgment that greatly exceeds the limits of her insurance
policy, assigns her cause of action against her own insurance company to the winning plaintiff, in
partial settlement of the judgment. In other words, assignment of the breach-of-duty-to-settle
claim serves to augment the funds that are available from the insurance company to pay the
original plaintiffs' damages and legal fees.
14. Charles v. Tamez, 878 S.W.2d 201, 206 (Tex. App. 1994); McCloskey v. San Antonio Trac-
tion Co., 192 S.W. 1116 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917, writ denied); Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v.
Ginther, 72 S.W. 166 (Tex. 1903); Assignability of Claim, supra note 8, at 502.
15. Compare McCloskey, 192 S.W. at 1116 (reversing injunction against defendant for solicit-
ing claims) with Ex Parte McCloskey, 199 S.W. 1101, 1104 (82 Tex. Crim. App. 1917), aff'd sub
nom. McCloskey v. Tobin, 252 U.S. 107, 108 (1920) (holding that state statute prohibiting the
soliciting and adjusting claims does not violate Fourteenth Amendment Rights). See generally
Shukaitis, supra note 8, at 342-43 (discussing Frank McCloskey's checkered career).
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But the Texas anti-barratry law cannot, by itself, explain the ab-
sence of a common practice of assignment of claims in that state. For
one thing, it is the same law that restricts solicitation by lawyers. Just
as accident victims now find their way to lawyers' offices in Houston-
presumably without impermissible solicitation by the lawyers-so too
could they find their way to the offices of professional claims buyers,
with equally little solicitation if that became a common practice.
Moreover, the range of permissible restrictions under an anti-barratry
statute is narrower now than it was in 1917. In 1977, in Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona,16 the Supreme Court held, under the First Amend-
ment, that a state may not forbid lawyers to publish truthful advertise-
ments that inform the public of their services. Since speech by lawyers
may be regulated, if anything, to a greater extent than speech by non-
lawyers, 17 Texas' anti-barratry statute must now be interpreted to per-
mit advertisements by non-lawyers that inform the general public that
they are in the lawful business of buying tort claims. It has not
happened.
My best guess is that no market for tort claims has developed in
Texas in part because this is an isolated exception to the general rule.
Since it is illegal almost everywhere, there is no accepted practice of
trading in such claims, and no respectable businesses do it. With law-
yers running the show, other potential market participants might sim-
ply have failed to notice that there are gaps in the wall. When Mr.
McCloskey did notice, a new statute was passed to put him out of
business, or at least to keep his business under control.18 Apparently
it worked well enough to discourage others from following in his foot-
steps. If it had not, I expect that another law would have been passed
to back it up, most likely a revision of the Texas Code adopting the
majority rule that tort claims may not be assigned in the first place.
If contingent fees were abolished the notion of a market in legal
claims might come into its own. It could develop from a couple of
different directions. Tort plaintiffs in Texas would become much more
interested in novel methods of financing litigation, and non-lawyer en-
trepreneurs might realize that there is money to be made by serving
that demand. Texas lawyers would no doubt try to put a stop to this
16. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
17. Because lawyers are essential to the system of justice, and serve as officers of the courts,
states are recognized to have a special interest in regulating their professional behavior. See
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447, 460, 467 (1978) (holding that disciplinary rules
could constitutionally prohibit solicitation by lawyers because of the state's particular interest in
regulating commercial speech by the legal profession).
18. See McCloskey, 199 S.W. at 1101-04 (discussing Act of March 29, 1917, c. 133, amending
Penal Code, art. 421).
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practice-as they would if it happened under our present system-but
in the absence of an alternative method of financing tort litigation,
they might fail. Once this practice became widespread in Texas, it
would spread to other states.
Alternatively, a market in legal claims could emerge directly in
states which follow the majority rule. Recall that most contract claims
are assignable even in those states that prohibit the assignment of tort
claims. Most law suits for money damages in America are tort cases,
primarily personal injury cases, but a sizeable minority are based on
contractual claims. The plaintiffs in these contract cases are also usu-
ally represented on a contingent fee basis, especially if they are indi-
viduals, although the practice is less uniform than for personal injury
claims.19 If contingent fees were outlawed, it would be possible,
within the existing legal framework, to develop a market for those
contract claims that are now represented on a contingency. The next
step would be flight, whenever possible, from tort claims (e.g., product
liability) to contract claims (e.g., breach of warranty) to facilitate as-
signment. Perhaps some courts could be persuaded that a tort claim
may be assigned if it is closely related to an assignable contract claim.
In any event, once a market in contract claims is well established, the
final step would be to extend it openly to tort claims.
3. Litigation Insurance
If the major purposes of contingent fees are to provide financing for
the extraordinary expenses of litigation and to protect plaintiffs
against the risk that those expenses will not be recovered, then there is
an obvious alternative method to serve the same purposes: insurance.
Insurance to cover the costs of bringing tort suits is virtually unknown
in the United States, but it is common in Germany, where contingent
fees are prohibited. For example, in 1979, forty percent of all West
German households carried insurance to cover at least some legal ex-
penses. A minority of those insurance policies (about forty percent)
were restricted to risks associated with automobile accidents, but most
covered general legal services as well.20 If contingent fees were abol-
ished, one likely result would be the development of a similar market
for first-party litigation insurance in America. How would it operate?
And how extensive would it become?
Litigation insurance would probably emerge in two contexts: (1) as
a line on other personal insurance policies, in particular automobile
19. Gross & Syverud, supra note 2, at 15-18.
20. Erhard Blankenburg, Legal Insurance, Litigant Decisions, and the Rising Caseloads of the
Courts: A West German Study, 16 L. & Soc'y REV. 601, 605 (1981-82).
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and homeowners insurance, but potentially also life, health or disabil-
ity-which is, apparently, the main form in which litigation insurance
is sold in Germany; and (2) as a fringe benefit for employees of large
organizations or as a benefit of labor union membership.21 This would
mean that insurance for legal fees would provide some access to the
courts by some middle-class plaintiffs who are in a position to buy it.
Poor people, unemployed and underemployed workers, those in mar-
ginal and temporary positions, and most self-employed workers-
most of these people would not buy litigation insurance under this
new regime, just as many of them do not have health insurance now.
However it is organized, a system of litigation insurance might be
susceptible to the related problems of adverse selection and moral
hazard. Those who are disproportionately likely to sue may be corre-
spondingly more likely than others to buy insurance to cover the costs
of doing so, and those who are insured may be prone to sue even
when they have no real cause to do so. A couple of studies from Ger-
many are reassuring on this account.2 2 They found that insured plain-
tiffs are more likely to sue than those who are uninsured, but not by
much.23 The authors of these studies dispute charges by some Ger-
man judges and lawyers that the availability of litigation insurance was
a major cause of the steep increase in litigation in Germany in the
1970s and 1980s;24 they argue instead that most people are reluctant to
sue whether or not their legal fees are covered by insurance.2 5 As a
result, German litigation insurers rarely invoke their contractual rights
to deny coverage to unfounded claims.26 Perhaps the same would be
true here.
21. Such plans are increasingly common. Linda Himelstein, Never Mind the 401(k)-How's
the Legal Plan?, Bus. WK., July 17, 1995, at 34; Myrna Oliver, New Services Plans Ease Burdens
of Legal System, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1987, at 3; Stephanie Simon, Opting for Cut-Rate Legal
Eagles, L.A. TIMES, June 7, 1996, at Al; see generally AMERICAN PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES
INSTITUTE, PREPAID GROUP LEGAL SERVICE PLANS (1979) (describing pre-paid legal plans that
are similar to health insurance programs). Perhaps the largest plan of this sort in the United
States is the UAW-GM Legal Services Plan. Under the existing structure of litigation, however,
that plan includes a telling exclusion: "[C]overage [under the plan] does not include ... matters
where representation on a contingent fee basis is available .... " UAW-GM LEGAL SERVICES
PLAN, SUMMARY PLAN DESCRIPTION 18 (Apr. 1983).
22. Erhard Blankenburg, Changes in Political Regimes and Continuity of the Rule of Law in
Germany, in COURTS, LAW & POLITICS, IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 249, 299 (Herbert Jacob
et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter Blankenburg, Changes in Political Regimes]; Blankenburg, supra
note 20, at 603.
23. See supra note 22.
24. Blankenburg, Changes in Political Regimes, supra note 22, at 298-99.
25. Blankenburg, Changes in Political Regimes, supra note 22, at 298-99; Blankenburg, supra
note 20, at 610-11.
26. Blankenburg, supra note 20, at 605.
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Under Germany's investigatory civil law system of adjudication,
lawyers play a smaller and less time consuming role in civil litigation
than they do in America.27 Also, legal fees in Germany are fixed by
law and depend exclusively on the amount in dispute and the stage of
the proceedings. 28 There is no similar schedule of compensation for
American lawyers; in civil cases, if lawyers are not paid on a contin-
gency, they are almost always paid by the hour.29 The combined effect
of hourly fees and of the larger role of lawyers in litigation could drive
the legal fees that insurers are responsible for in America higher than
they are in Germany, and make them more variable. Even if they
have no need to restrict the cases which insured plaintiffs are allowed
to bring, litigation insurers would need to limit the fees that lawyers
are paid to handle those cases. If plaintiffs are allowed to choose their
own lawyers, the insurance companies would face an insurmountable
task if they tried to monitor the time those lawyers devote to their
work. Instead, like health insurers, they would have to develop pri-
vate fee schedules, with compensation set by type of case and by task.
Most probably, like managed care health providers, insurers would
restrict the plaintiffs' choice of lawyers to lists of those who agree in
advance to work within this fee structure. One way or another, this
arrangement would put new strains on the attorney-client
relationship.
Consider three scenarios that might emerge. First, the plaintiff's at-
torney could receive a fixed fee for a case, whether it is settled or
tried. In that situation, everybody will know that the attorney has a
financial incentive to settle at any cost, and the defendant may be able
to exploit that transparent conflict between the plaintiff and her law-
yer. Second, the attorney could get paid an additional fee to proceed
to trial, but only if the insurer approves-much the way managed care
networks require pre-approval for many medical procedures. The
main criteria for approval would be the reasonableness of the defend-
ant's settlement offer, which means that litigation insurance compa-
nies would be in the business of telling plaintiffs when to settle and
when to go on to court. Third, the litigation insurance company could
address the problem of supervising the attorneys' time and effort di-
rectly by requiring plaintiffs to use its own staff of salaried attorneys,
in the same way that patients in the Kaiser-Permanente health care
27. Peter Gottwald, Simplified Civil Procedure in West Germany, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 687, 689-
90 (1983); John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823,
826 (1985).
28. Gottwald, supra note 27, at 701.
29. Gross & Syverud, supra note 2, at 15-18.
[Vol. 47:321
1998] IF CONTINGENT LEGAL FEES WERE BANNED 333
system must be treated by Kaiser-Permanente's employee
physicians. 30
The first system (fixed fee per case) is a non-starter. It would come
apart quickly under the strains of our lawyer dominated adversary sys-
tem of litigation. The second system (trial requires insurer approval)
might work, but it would be tricky. It would give defendants opportu-
nities to exploit conflicts between plaintiffs, their attorneys, and their
insurance companies; and it would be hard to calibrate a lawyer's
compensation to the effort a case deserves. The third system, salaried
insurance company lawyers, is the simplest, and would probably win
out. Ultimately, it would become something like a vastly expanded
and privately financed program of legal aid for the middle class. It
might work, but in the process plaintiffs would lose the opportunity to
choose their lawyers, and the lawyers that are chosen for them would
become company employees.
How affordable would litigation insurance be? That would depend
to a great extent on the ability of the insurance companies to control
costs, which would probably favor companies that employ their own
attorneys. Most likely, it would cost more in America than it does in
Germany, since in America's privatized system of litigation lawyers do
more and are paid more. One change that might significantly reduce
the cost of litigation insurance would be a change to the German sys-
tem of requiring the losing party to pay the winner's attorney's fees.
Under the current American system of litigation, there is no major
constituency for fee shifting. Plaintiffs, who are typically risk averse,
do not want it. A fee-shifting regime might increase their verdicts in
cases in which they go to trial and win; it might even increase the
value of settlements in the vast proportion of cases that do not go to
trial. But the possibility of a somewhat higher return if they win is not
30. Under existing arrangements, civil defense lawyers-who rarely receive contingent fees-
are hostile to attempts to change their terms of compensation from the traditional hourly fee.
Occasionally, they get support from the courts. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court of Ken-
tucky held in 1996 that it was unethical for an attorney to contract with a liability insurer to
handle all the insurer's defense work for a fixed fee per case. American Ins. Ass'n v. Kentucky
State Bar, 917 S.W.2d 568, 572-73 (Ky. 1996). In the process, the court also approved an earlier
ruling by the Ethics Committee for the Kentucky State Bar that forbade insurance companies
from using staff attorneys to defend liability suits against their insured. Id. at 571. This decision
puts Kentucky in a small minority among states that have addressed the issue. Charles Silver,
Flat Fees and Staff Attorneys: Unnecessary Casualties in the Continuing Battle over the Law
Governing Insurance Defense Lawyers 5 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the DePaul Law
Review). It is also indefensible. Both flat fees and representation by staff attorneys (public
defenders) are common in the defense of indigent criminal defendants-a context in which the
ethical obligations of the lawyers are, if anything, greater than in civil litigation-and they are
universally accepted as proper.
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worth the risk of an out-of-pocket liability if they do not win, espe-
cially since the victorious defendant might actually try to collect.
Plaintiffs' attorneys do not want fee shifting. Admittedly, it would in-
crease their recoveries at trial, and perhaps in pre-trial settlements,
but under the usual contingent fee contract they would only receive a
third of any net fee awards. To receive that additional sum, however,
they would have to give up the rhetoric of "No Win, No Pay," which is
the core of the pitch they use to recruit clients and to get those clients
to agree to comparatively high contingent fees. And defendants do
not want fee shifting. The threat of paying the defendants' fees may
be scary to some plaintiffs, but in reality defendants and their insur-
ance companies are not likely to collect much from losing plaintiffs,
since most plaintiffs have little net worth or are absolutely judgment
proof. On the other hand, defendants-or their insurers-are almost
always solvent. They would be forced to actually pay almost every fee
award in favor of plaintiffs. Moreover, to the extent that fee awards
figure into settlements, defendants will end up paying the great major-
ity of legal fees, since plaintiffs get monetary settlements in the great
majority of cases.
In the brave new world of litigation insurance, however, there
would be a powerful new constituency for fee shifting: the litigation
insurers. A litigation insurer would be what is now a rare beast in
American civil litigation: an institutional plaintiffs' litigation office.
Like civil plaintiffs' representatives everywhere, it would usually get a
recovery, in most cases, by settlement. Since the insurer would con-
trol the settlement negotiations, it could structure the agreements to
explicitly segregate fees, which the insurer recovers, from damages,
which go to the client. This could be a major boon to litigation insur-
ers, even if the insurers (rather than their clients) were required to pay
the defendants' fees in the small proportion of cases that produce no
recovery, since the fees would usually flow in their direction.
Litigation insurers might be able to successfully promote this
change. Fee shifting could enable the insurers to recover the great
majority of their legal fees and litigation expenses, and to cut their
premiums dramatically, by thirty, fifty, perhaps even eighty or ninety
percent. If litigation insurance became a common middle-class
method of obtaining representation, a rule that makes that insurance
more affordable would be politically attractive-especially if it has a
ring of fairness to it, and fee shifting does have that. The end result
could be a form of litigation insurance-that is reasonable in price and
that includes protection against both liability and legal fees. That
would mean that an insured accident victim could get a lawyer to han-
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die her case with no out-of-pocket payment and no risk of future lia-
bility for fees or costs. For an insured plaintiff, the process would look
a lot like the present system, except that the lawyer she gets would be
paid, monitored, and probably chosen (if not employed) by an insur-
ance company.
For poor people, a similar state of affairs could be achieved by a
vast expansion of legal aid. At the moment that sounds like a political
pipe dream, 31 but in the imaginary world of no contingent fees many
things would be different. Poor accident victims would have no other
access to recovery, and the cost of legal aid (in a fee-shifting regime)
would be comparatively cheap: a public subsidy equivalent to the pri-
vate litigation insurance premiums the rest of us would pay. The
ABA and other established bar organizations, acting on the same
combination of professional idealism and self interest that led them to
oppose the dismemberment of the Legal Services Corporation, 32
might lead a movement to expand legal aid to fill some of the vacuum
left by abolishing contingent fees. Perhaps they would succeed, at
least in part.
B. Cost and Risk Reduction
1. Controlling Lawyers' Hours and Fees
Contingent fees, as many scholars have pointed out, create a poten-
tial conflict between the interests of the lawyer and those of the cli-
ent.33 On the one hand, the marginal cost to the client of the lawyer's
time is zero; therefore, it might be in the client's interest for the law-
yer to spend vast amounts of time to increase the recovery in a case,
even by a small sum. On the other hand, even a sensible investment
of additional time might be uneconomical for the lawyer, who receives
only a third of the return for her work. Nonetheless, under a contin-
gent fee contract, the interests of the lawyer and of the client are rea-
31. Federal funding of legal aid, in the form of the Legal Services Corporation, has been
under attack for years, primarily from conservatives who view the Legal Services Corporation as
a liberal ideological machine, advancing a left-wing agenda at taxpayer expense. See David E.
Rovella, Will Court Win Spur GOP Backlash, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 13, 1997, at Al; Robert Schmidt,
Congress Sharpens Ax with LSC in its Sights, RECORDER, Mar. 5, 1997, at 1, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Papers File; Richard Willing, Federal Legal Service for Poor Faces Budget Cuts,
Possible Elimination, DET. NEWS & FREE PRESS, Sept. 3, 1995, at llA, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Papers File.
32. See Rhonda McMillion, Grappling over Future of LSC, 81 A.B.A. J. 100, 100 (1995);
Rhonda McMillion, LSC Down but Not Out, 82 A.B.A. J. 118, 118 (1996).
33. F.B. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 196-200 (1964); Kevin M.
Clermont & John D. Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 529, 534-
37 (1978); Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 198-
202 (1987).
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sonably well aligned. The client has only an indirect interest in the
number of hours worked by the lawyer, and both have similar inter-
ests in the total recovery. Equally important, a contingent fee re-
quires no monitoring or even record keeping of the lawyer's time,
since the fee is set solely by the settlement or award. And since the
plaintiff's lawyer is paid from the recovery, and paid only if there is a
recovery, it may seem that the fee is paid by the defendant and won by
the plaintiff's attorney.
With hourly fees, the plaintiff's lawyer loses any direct financial in-
terest in the outcome of the case. Worse, the lawyer and the client
now have opposing interests in the amount of time the lawyer spends
working on the case-the longer the former works the more she earns,
and the more the latter pays. This sort of fee arrangement can breed
friction and ill will, especially if the charges are high, the client has
little experience with the type of work, and there is no prior relation-
ship between the parties.
If plaintiffs end up paying their lawyers by the hour, they will want
to be able to better monitor their lawyers' time and effort. That will
be hard for inexperienced one-shot player plaintiffs: How can anyone
who does not do that sort of work tell whether twenty hours is a rea-
sonable amount of time for rebuilding the engine of a car, or repairing
the damaged foundation of a garage, or painting a portrait, or han-
dling the negotiations in a $10,000 automobile accident case? For
legal representation the problem is especially difficult because in
many cases neither the amount of work required nor the quality of the
outcome can be predicted with any confidence. Perhaps novel mecha-
nisms for monitoring will develop: manuals or other sources of infor-
mation for clients; time-keeping systems that both account for and
explain the lawyer's work; who knows what else. Alternatively, plain-
tiffs may be more comfortable with a system of representation that
does not require them to pay their lawyers by the hour: a system in
which they pay a fixed fee for a case or for each stage of a case, or a
system in which their lawyers are employees of other entities-for ex-
ample, litigation insurance companies.
If individual plaintiffs do pay their lawyers by the hour, that will
have two additional consequences for the structure of civil litigation.
First, it will change the terms of pre-trial negotiations to the advantage
of civil defendants. Under the current contingent fee practice, a plain-
tiff's lawyer can truthfully tell her opponent that if the settlement offer
is too low the plaintiff will happily proceed to trial, since, as far as the
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client is concerned, the trial is already paid for.34 But if the defendant
knows that the plaintiff will have to pay new money to go to trial,
perhaps a lot of it, trial becomes a less credible threat. Second, paying
by the hour will put pressure on lawyers' fees and drive them down.
At present, it is uncommon for plaintiffs' attorneys to compete by va-
rying the terms of the contingent fee contracts that they offer. 35 But if
they have to charge by the hour, they will have to compete to attract
middle-class and working-class accident victims. Competition will be
all the more fierce since the abolition of contingent fees will probably
produce a significant reduction in litigation and a glut of attorneys.
And it will not just affect plaintiffs' attorneys; the loss of business and
the glut of lawyers will hit both sides of the street. There will be a
parallel loss of compensation for civil defense lawyers, and, as the rip-
ples expand, for the legal profession in general.
2. Alternatives to Full-dress Litigation
The banning of contingent fees would make lawyers harder to ob-
tain and force many plaintiffs to pay their lawyers by the hour. As a
result, there would be an increase in the demand for forms of dispute
resolution that require less lawyer time, or none at all. Several forms
of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) might fit this bill and would
be natural candidates to meet that demand. But there is a hitch. In
the usual tort case, there is no pre-existing relationship between the
parties. Therefore, they must agree on an alternative to litigation, if at
all, after the claim has matured-i.e., after the accident has happened.
At that stage, the defendant-or in most cases, its insurer-will have
little incentive to agree to an alternative to litigation, since, in the ab-
sence of contingent fees, litigation itself will be such a disadvantage to
the plaintiff.
Some forms of ADR might grow to fill some of the gaps left by the
demise of contingent fees, if they can be required by rule or statute, or
agreed to by the parties in advance. The natural candidate is arbitra-
tion. Legislatures could require arbitration for certain types of
claims-for example, automobile-accident claims below a certain level
of damages. Some hospitals and health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) already try to persuade their patients (and potential future
plaintiffs) to agree in advance to settle claims by arbitration, and some
require them to do so. 36 Without contingent fees to provide access to
34. Gross & Syverud, supra note 4, at 349-50.
35. Kritzer, supra note 1, at 285-90.
36. See Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 552 P.2d 1178,1184 (Cal. 1976) (holding that insurers
may include mandatory arbitration procedures in health insurance packages); Victoria Slind-
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the courts, arbitration clauses will become much more popular with
patients. They might become a selling point: The Good Provider
Health Maintenance Organization is so confident of its services and so
concerned for the welfare of its patients that it offers them a built-in
affordable way to obtain compensation, if compensation is deserved,
instead of forcing them to use the prohibitively expensive remedy of
the personal injury law suit.
As we now use it, arbitration itself frequently involves lawyers. 37
Arbitration does use less of the lawyers' time than trials, which will be
attractive to plaintiffs who pay by the hour. But for arbitration to best
fill the needs of a post-contingent fee world, the role of lawyers would
have to be minimized, or eliminated altogether-as it is in most small
claims courts.
Small claims courts are the ultimate in people's justice. They typi-
cally operate with no lawyers and no legal fees.38 They might serve as
a model for lawyerless arbitration in specialized contexts. They would
certainly experience a major boom in their own business, since for
many plaintiffs a small claims recovery, even if it is only a fraction of
their damages, would be the only alternative to getting nothing at all.
The apparent injustice of that state of affairs would create pressure to
increase the jurisdictional limits of small claims courts,39 or to create a
new layer of not-quite-so-small-claims courts that have somewhat
more elaborate procedures but still operate without lawyers.
3. Self-representation
In small claims court, self-representation is often mandatory. That
makes it an attractive forum for litigants who cannot afford lawyers, a
field on which they are on reasonably equal terms with richer oppo-
Flor, California High Court Agrees to Hear HMO Arbitration Case, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 20, 1995, at
A7 (discussing recent controversy over Kaiser Foundation Health Plan's 20 year-old mandatory
arbitration procedures); see also Cannon v. Lane, 867 P.2d 1235, 1239 (Okla. 1993) (holding that
HMO binding arbitration provisions may be void as contrary to public policy).
37. See, e.g., Raymond J. Broderick, Court-Annexed Compulsory Arbitration: It Works, 72
JUDICATURE 217 (1988-1989) (referring to the continuing presence of attorneys in arbitration
proceedings); cf. Paul D. Carrington, ADR and Future Adjudication: A Primer on Dispute Reso-
lution, 15 REV. LITIG. 485, 489-92 (1996) (discussing the use of alternative dispute resolution,
including arbitration, as a means of decreasing the role of lawyers in the legal process).
38. In some states, attorney representation is prohibited in most small claims cases. See, e.g.,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-512 (1956); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 116.530 (West 1982 & Supp.
1997). In others, it is permitted but not required. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 205.763
(West 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503:2 (1997).
39. At the moment, the common jurisdictional limits of small claims courts are modest, but
not insignificant. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-503 (1956 & Supp. 1996) (generally
$2,500); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 116.220 (West 1982 & Supp. 1997) (generally $5,000); TEX.
GOV'T CODE ANN. § 28.003 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997) ($5,000).
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nents. But self-representation is also possible, if not easy, in ordinary
civil courts of general jurisdiction. In a world without contingent fees,
self-representation in ordinary civil litigation will become more com-
mon for the simple reason that some plaintiffs will have no better op-
tion. Increased interest in self-representation will fuel a rapid
expansion in the In Pro Per industry.40 There will be new manuals,
videos, courses, software, and Internet services designed and mar-
keted to help lay people file and prosecute law suits on their own be-
half. Before long colorful successful pro se litigants will become well-
known media personalities: few melodrama characters have longer
pedigrees than the Common Man Who Beat The Lawyers. They will
proselytize the virtues of self-representation, they will take calls on
radio and TV talk shows-and like other proponents of the In Pro Per
revolution, they will put pressure on the line that divides lawful advice
and education from the unlawful practice of law without a license.
4. Simplification of the Rules
Just as the abolition of contingent fees would create pressure for
cheaper alternatives to ordinary litigation, so it would create pressure
for cheaper and simpler rules for those cases that are litigated in court.
Part of the push would come from the enlarged corps of pro se liti-
gants, since the disadvantages of inexperience and lack of training are
magnified by complex rules of practice. In addition, plaintiffs who pay
their lawyers by the hour will want the rules of civil procedure simpli-
fied to reduce the time and expense of the process. All sorts of rules
might be up for grabs, from filing and service of process through ap-
peal. The most logical candidates for pruning, however, are pre-trial
discovery and the right to a jury trial. If pre-trial discovery were
greatly simplified, and if pre-trial proceedings in general were brought
under tight judicial control in the context of a non-jury system of adju-
dication, then it might just be possible to dramatically limit litigation
costs.
Another type of move that might be tried is simplification of the
substantive rules that govern compensation. The likely change in this
domain would be a retreat from the fault principle. In theory, that
ought to make trials simpler and recovery cheaper and easier to ob-
tain. Whether that would happen in practice is not so clear. Experi-
40. In the past twenty years, there has already been a dramatic increase in the provision of
legal services and information by nonlawyers. See Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalism in Per-
spective: Alternative Approaches to Nonlawyer Practice, 22 N.Y.U. RaV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 701,
704 (1996) (discussing the expansion and composition of nonlawyer practice and its effects on
the legal profession).
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ence with "strict liability" in product liability litigation suggests that if
substantial defenses are developed, and if the procedural context re-
mains the same, purporting to remove fault as an element of a cause
of action will do little or nothing to simplify practice. 41
5. Public Prosecution
Drivers who are sued for negligence may also be cited for violating
traffic laws. Manufacturers that are sued by their neighbors for inju-
ries caused by toxic pollutants may be sued by the state for damages
and clean-up costs, and may also be prosecuted for criminal offenses.
Doctors who are sued for medical malpractice may also have their
medical licenses revoked. There is a hydraulic relationship between
private and public litigation. The elimination of contingent fees, by
making the former more difficult, will increase the pressure on gov-
ernment lawyers to pursue the latter. This will happen for two
reasons.
First, public prosecution will be more necessary to serve the deter-
rence and incapacitation functions that are now served by a combina-
tion of public and private litigation. For example, to the extent that
medical malpractice litigation wanes, there may be increased demand
for license revocation proceedings as the only remaining mechanism
to deter careless conduct by doctors and to root out the incompetents.
In addition, civil litigation against a wrongdoer sometimes serves an
expressive or retributive function. To the extent that private litigation
is suppressed, public prosecution may grow to fill the void.
Second, there will be pressure to increase the use of public prosecu-
tions in order to help private plaintiffs recover damages. For example,
at present many motorists are allowed to plead "no contest" to traffic
violations in order to avoid the risk that guilty pleas or judgments of
conviction will be used against them in a civil law suit.42 If private law
suits become more difficult to pursue, potential plaintiffs in traffic ac-
41. See Choharis, supra note 10, at 447-48; Richard A. Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas
in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 215 (1974) ("[T]he similarities between the
common law of negligence and the system of strict liability.., are perhaps more important than
the differences between them."); see generally James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. TWerski,
Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263 (1991) (describing the history and development of product liability law in
the United States).
42. Thus, for example Federal Rule of Evidence 410 provides in part: "[E]vidence of the fol-
lowing is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made the
plea... (2) a plea of nolo contendere .... " FED. R. EvID. 410. The Advisory Committee Note
to this rule explains: "The present rule gives effect to the principal traditional characteristic of
the nolo plea, i.e., avoiding the admission of guilt which is inherent in pleas of guilty." Id. at 410
advisory committee's notes (emphasis in original); see also id. at 803(22) (providing that felony
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cident cases may need more help. As a result the private plaintiffs will
be more likely to object to the entry of "no contest" pleas, prosecutors
and judges will be less likely to accept them, and more criminal traffic
cases will be forced to trial. At the other end of the spectrum, there
will be more pressure on public prosecutors to pursue major toxic tort,
environmental, and commercial fraud prosecutions, in order to pave
the way for private litigants; in some contexts, this might even take the
form of direct representation of private claimants by public attorneys.
C. Claim Reduction
1. Increase in Uncompensated Claims
One of the chief complaints by the opponents of the contingent fee
is that it has helped produce an epidemic of meritless litigation.
43
What makes these law suits attractive (we are told) is the notorious
unpredictability of American civil justice in general, and of jury ver-
dicts in particular. If the damages are very high, and if your claim has
some emotional hook, there is always a chance that a crazy jury will
give you a ton of money, regardless of the evidence and in the teeth of
the law. Naturally, some plaintiffs are anxious to gamble on these un-
likely verdicts: the prizes are so tempting. Contingent fees enable
plaintiffs to enter these litigation lotteries at no out-of-pocket cost.
They also give plaintiffs' lawyers financial incentives to encourage
their clients to do so, and to devote their own time and money to these
undeserving cases. Defendants, insurance companies, and by exten-
sion all of us, pay the piper: every bogus case must be defended; some-
times the plaintiff does win big; more often an honest manufacturer or
a careful doctor settles to avoid the risk of a ruinous verdict. And so,
the argument goes, if contingent fees were banned, plaintiffs would
not be able to sue so easily, and unscrupulous plaintiffs' attorneys
could not get rich by drumming up phony cases.
Banning contingent fees might well reduce the number of meritless
claims, but the main mechanism would be brute force. The single
most likely effect of this reform will be a great reduction in the total
number of claims that obtain compensation-including many that
have merit, and some that do not. Whatever else might be said about
the contingent fee, it is a great leveler. Assuming equal information,
an indigent tort victim is almost as well situated to get high quality
convictions after trial or guilty plea, "but not upon a plea of nolo contendere," are admissible in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule).
43. E.g., Contingent Fee Abuses, Hearings on Contingency Fee Abuses Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Lester Brickman, Professor, Cardozo
School of Law), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, CNGTST file.
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representation as an upper-middle-class victim. Unless a market in
tort claims is developed as a substitute, eliminating contingent fees
will greatly increase the advantages of wealth in litigation. Poor peo-
ple will have a much harder time getting lawyers, and many claims for
which they would have received compensation under the present sys-
tem will not be pursued at all.
In a contingent fee system, a plaintiff has little or no incentive to
refrain from filing a claim-if she can get a lawyer to represent her.
As Herbert Kritzer and Mitchell Pickerill have shown, this puts plain-
tiffs' lawyers in the role of gatekeepers to the courts, in which capacity
they reject more cases than they accept. 44 Under ordinary circum-
stances, contingent fee lawyers must prefer cases that are likely to win;
any other strategy would be ruinous. The contingent fee, by giving
plaintiffs' lawyers a financial interest in the outcomes of their cases,
serves the socially useful function of motivating those lawyers to sift
the good claims from the bad. If contingent fees are eliminated, that
winnowing function will be destroyed.
It may also be true that in some unusual contexts the contingent fee
system creates incentives for attorneys to file complaints in cases in
which the potential damages are very high, but the probability of win-
ning is low. This could be the case, for example, for some mass toxic
torts. If so, the abolition of contingent fees might change that prac-
tice-or it might not, depending on what happens next.
Imagine a post-contingent fee system that relies primarily on plain-
tiffs' lawyers who are hired by individual plaintiffs and paid by the
hour. In that situation, the lawyers will have a strong economic incen-
tive to favor cases that will require a lot of their time, and that are
brought by clients who can afford to pay them. The lawyers will still
have personal, ethical, professional and reputational incentives to
favor meritorious cases and to give good advise, but even a skeptic
about the unique power of economic incentives might conclude that
this will be a less efficient system for sorting cases by merit than one
driven by the lawyers' self-interest. On the clients' side, these plain-
tiffs of the future who pay their lawyers by the hour will be much
more careful in filing law suits than those of the present, who do not.
They will not want to take risks for good and obvious reasons: even
those plaintiffs who are able to afford litigation will be squeezed by
the costs; as one-shot players, they will not be able to spread their
44. Herbert M. Kritzer & J. Mitchell Pickerill, Contingent Fee Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the
American Civil Justice System (paper presented at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA, Aug. 28-Sept. 1, 1996) (on file with the DePaul
Law Review).
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risks over many cases; and they will have a hard time evaluating their
chances. The likely net result is that they will become excessively cau-
tious. They will not play many lottery-type long shots, which may be
good, but they also will not sue in many winning cases that would have
been brought under the contingent fee system.
On the other hand, what if the next step is the development of a
market in tort claims?45 In that situation, poor people will have at
least as much access to compensation as they now have, and the pro-
portion of meritorious claims that are compensated might well in-
crease. At the same time, the potential for gambling on low-
probability/high-damage tort cases might also increase, since the
claims could be bought outright by well-financed risk-neutral claims
merchants.
2. First-party Insurance
One way to avoid the difficulty of collecting damages from
tortfeasors is through first-party insurance. Uninsured motorist cover-
age serves that function. In theory, uninsured motorists are responsi-
ble for the harm they have done us; in practice we insure because it is
impractical or impossible to make them pay. Since the abolition of
contingent fees will make it more difficult and expensive to collect
damages through the tort system, it will increase the demand for first-
party insurance as an alternative form of compensation. Like litiga-
tion insurance, this new first-party tort insurance will probably be
marketed as a line on other personal insurance policies-automobile,
homeowner's, health, disability, life-or as a component of employ-
ees' fringe benefit packages. As with litigation insurance, this option
is not likely to benefit the poor, who carry little or no insurance as it
is. And, as with litigation insurance, that gap could be closed by pub-
lic subsidies or by an expanded program of social insurance. At the
moment, of course, no such public program is politically conceivable.
Ultimately, first-party insurance could absorb third-party claims di-
rectly. Jeffrey O'Connell has proposed a system of first-party accident
insurance that is partly financed by transferring the victims' tort
claims to the insurers.46 Under this scheme, an insured pedestrian
45. See supra notes 8-19 and accompanying text.
46. Jeffrey O'Connell, Harnessing the Liability Lottery: Elective First Party No-Fault Insurance
Financed by Third-Party Tort Claims, 1978 WASH. U. L.Q. 693, 697 [hereinafter O'Connell, Har-
nessing the Liability Lottery]; Jeffrey O'Connell & Janet Beck, Overcoming Legal Barriers to the
Transfer of Third-Party Tort Claims as a Means of Financing First-Party No-Fault Insurance, 1980
WASH. U. L.Q. 55, 55-8. My description of O'Connell's plan does not do full justice to the
original. In particular, for the sake of simplicity, I have not mentioned the special provisions he
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who is injured by a motorist will receive compensation from his or her
own insurance company, and will in turn assign the tort claim to that
company. Under current law in most states, a first-party insurer may
obtain "subrogation rights" for payments made to a policy holder.
The insurer may recover the amount it paid out (but no more) from
any third party that is responsible for the harm to the insured. 47 This
subrogation right is a limited exception to the rule prohibiting the as-
signment of tort claims. 48 O'Connell proposes extending that excep-
tion to allow the insurance company to recover on the entire claim. In
effect, O'Connell has proposed a limited market for tort claims in
which the only qualified buyers are insurance companies who buy up
the claims in advance. So far, no state has adopted O'Connell's pro-
posal, but if the abolition of contingent fees made recovery in tort
much more difficult, it would be an attractive method to help fill the
gap by lowering the premiums for first-party insurance.
From the point of view of the defendants, this new arrangement
may look quite a bit like the same old tort system. About as many
claims will be brought, at least by insured plaintiffs, and they will be
handled by the same combination of litigation and negotiation. The
only formal difference would be that the claims would be owned and
prosecuted by the plaintiffs' insurance companies. In practice,
O'Connell anticipates that these cases will be handled much more
cheaply and routinely, by large scale settlements between insurance
companies on the two sides of the table. 49 From the point of view of
plaintiffs, however, things will look very different. They not only give
up their rights to sue, in return for compensation-as they would in
any system in which their claims are assigned-but they do so in ad-
vance. When they buy insurance, they give up their rights to sue for
future injuries with unknown causes and unknown consequences.
Robert Cooter and Stephen Sugarman have proposed to make the
transformation of third-party claims into first-party insurance even
more explicit.50 Under their scheme, workers would sell their unma-
tured pre-injury tort rights against manufacturers of products that
includes to avoid conflicts of interest between an insurer and its insured. See O'Connell, Harnes-
sing the Liability Lottery, supra, at 698-701.
47. See O'Connell & Beck, supra note 46, at 67-74.
48. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
49. O'Connell, Harnessing the Liability Lottery, supra note 46, at 703.
50. STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW: NEW COMPENSA-
TION MECHANISMS FOR VICrIMS, CONSUMERS, AND BUSINESS 202-09 (1989); Robert Cooter &
Stephen D. Sugarman, A Regulated Market in Unmatured Tort Claims: Tort Reform by Contract,
in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW 174, 175 (Walter Olsen ed., 1988); Robert Cooter, To-
ward a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 VA. L. REv. 383, 391 (1989).
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might injure them to their own employers, in return for additional
compensation or health and insurance benefits.51 The employers, in
turn, would consolidate these rights and sell them back to the poten-
tial defendants. The net effect would be that manufacturers would
pay the insurance premiums for the workers' additional health and
disability benefits, in consideration of reduced exposure to product
liability litigation. As Sugarman and his colleagues recognize, this
transformation, if widely extended, would mean the demise of per-
sonal injury litigation as we know it.52
III. CONCLUSION
We have developed a very expensive, highly complex, privatized,
lawyer-dominated system of civil litigation. Almost no litigants can
afford to play this game with their own money. Instead, they are fi-
nanced by liability insurance, and by contingent fees-which, in turn,
are financed by liability insurance. With this financial backing, we are
able to maintain a high rate of civil litigation, and a large corps of
lawyers who are well paid to prosecute and defend civil claims. If the
contingent fee were pulled from the foundation, the whole structure
might fall to the ground-or it might be propped up in some new and
reduced form. The real issue is not so much what the direct effects of
abolishing contingent fees would be, but how those who are affected
would respond.
Speculating about what might happen to the American system of
civil litigations if contingent fees were abolished is a bit like writing
science fiction: an opportunity to imagine a change so basic and so
improbable that it would have many complicated and bizarre conse-
quences. The conceptual problem is also the same as in science fic-
tion. It is impossible to say which of these consequences would
actually occur or how they would interact with each other. The only
clear lesson to draw from all this is that it will not happen, not any
time soon, not unless other events change the context. Even the
lamest pass at predicting the effects of abolishing contingent fees
quickly highlights predictable points of resistance, and there are many.
Despite these disclaimers, and despite the fact that this is fantasy
rather than prediction, I believe there are three types of changes that
would very likely follow the abolition of contingent fees.
First, there would be a great decrease in the number of damage
claims brought in court or in any forum. In addition to the effects that
51. SUGARMAN, supra note 50, at 202-09.
52. Id.
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would have on the potential claimants and defendants, this decrease in
litigation would have major repercussions for the legal profession and
the legal system as a whole.
Second, there would be moves to simplify the procedures for pursu-
ing claims in courts and to create simpler alternatives to formal litiga-
tion. Some of the basic components of our system of civil litigation,
from discovery through jury trial, might end up on the chopping block.
Third, the system of compensation for accidents would change in
kind. In theory, our present system is based on adjudication of fault;
in practice, it consists primarily of adversarial bargaining in the
shadow of that sort of adjudication. If contingent fees were abolished,
most accident victims might come to rely primarily on payments from
first-party insurers, or from claims merchants who buy up their causes
of action after the fact and extract their value en mass. One way or
the other, adjudication would atrophy and the process of obtaining
compensation for injuries would become increasingly bureaucratic.
